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Vertical and Horizontal Perspectives on
Rights Consciousness
DAVID M. ENGEL*
ABSTRACT
It has become commonplace to assert that rights consciousness is
expanding globally and that individuals worldwide are demonstrating
an increasing awareness of and insistence upon their legal entitlements.
To marshal empirical support for such claims is, however, exceedingly
complex. One important line of socio-legal research on rights
consciousness adopts what might be called a "vertical" perspective,
tracing the flow of legal forms and practices from prestigious and
authoritative centers of cultural production to local settings, where they
may be adopted, resisted, or transformed. Vertical perspectives on global
rights consciousness have broadened and enriched the field of law and
society by examining linkages between local communities and world
capitals, individuals and international organizations, and everyday
interactions and systems of global regulation and enforcement. Yet,
vertical perspectives in themselves cannot determine whether rights
consciousness has expanded in relation to other systems of norm
enforcement and dispute resolution. To answer this question, vertical
perspectives must be combined with horizontal perspectives to ascertain
what norms, practices, and beliefs prevail within various social fields
where ordinary people engage in everyday interactions. A combination of
vertical and horizontal perspectives is illustrated by research on rights
consciousness in northern Thailand, which suggests the counterintuitive
conclusion that rights consciousness may have diminished and that
ordinary people rely instead on new forms of religiosity to justify inaction
even in the face of serious legal harms.
* SUNY Distinguished Service Professor, University at Buffalo School of Law, State
University of New York. Thanks to Frances Stephenson and Lauren Gray for assistance
with the research, to Michael McCann for helpful comments, and to Jaruwan S. Engel for
her many contributions and suggestions.
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly one hour's drive from the city of Chiangmai in northern
Thailand stands a small schoolhouse in a village surrounded by rice
fields and longan orchards. Longan, known in Thai as lamyai, are a
delectable fruit, similar to the lychee, and the villagers have found
ready markets for their products throughout Thailand even during bad
economic times. Despite the popularity of locally grown lamyai, youth in
increasing numbers have left this village for the city, and many adults
have sought wage labor far from the community in which they were
born. Several years ago, as the student population dwindled, the school
was closed and the children were sent to classes in a nearby town.
Villagers still use the schoolhouse from time to time as a meeting
center.
One December day several years ago, I traveled to this schoolhouse
with a group of Thai graduate students to practice their interview skills
in a class on rights consciousness.' As the students dispersed with
village volunteers in small interview groups seated on chairs and
benches in the schoolyard, a poster on the wall of the old school building
caught my eye. Entitled Rights of Children, it had apparently been sent
to thousands of primary schools by Thailand's Ministry of Social
Development and Human Security. The poster featured colorful
cartoons of Thai children and adults, and beneath each cartoon a short
statement summarized the rights that every child holds. These included
the right to an education, the right to health, the right to receive
information and ideas, the right to rest and leisure, the right to
participate in cultural life and the arts, the right to remain with one's
parents in accordance with the latter's wishes, the right to protection
from sexual exploitation, and the right to free expression and the
communication of information or views. Later, I realized that this
impressive list of rights, translated into cartoons of everyday Thai life,
came directly from the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC), which had been adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in
1989.2 The Thai government, after ratifying the CRC, attempted to
1. "Rights consciousness" refers to the understandings of law and the social practices
through which individuals and groups come to embrace, ignore, manipulate, remain
unaware of, or consciously reject rights in relation to their everyday experiences. See
generally DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND
IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003); PATRICIA EWICK &
SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998);
MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL
MOBILIZATION (1994).
2. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49, at 167 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989),
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translate its provisions into easily understandable words and images,
which it then disseminated at the grassroots level by distributing the
poster that I viewed in the village schoolhouse outside Chiangmai.
As I stood reading the poster, the Thai graduate students were busy
asking their small groups of adults and teenagers about everyday
activities and experiences that had potentially significant legal aspects,
such as access to land and natural resources, disputing and dispute
resolution, physical harms, and family conflicts. In these conversations,
according to the later reports of the students, none of the villagers used
the Thai term for rights, sit or sitthi. As far as the students could
determine, the concept of rights had no part in the everyday discourse of
the villagers. Although the interviewees had surely heard the word sit
used by politicians, media figures, nongovernmental organization (NGO)
representatives, or government officials, it was not part of their own
everyday speech. Even when speaking of matters that could have
important legal dimensions, they did not invoke the language of rights.
Indeed, the findings of the students in this regard were consistent with
my own research in Thailand over a period of many years.
The image of this tattered poster on the wall of a disused
schoolhouse now strikes me as symbolic. Like many symbols, it can be
read in different ways. On the one hand, the poster could be taken as
evidence of the transnational expansion of the ideology of rights, from
distant centers of neoliberal cultural production in Europe and North
America through the ministries of the Thai government down to the
village level. This reading is what might be called a vertical perspective
on transnational legalism. Vertical research traces concepts or practices
from what are conceived as higher, more powerful, prestigious, or
inclusive levels of legal organization to what are conceived as lower, less
powerful, and more localized levels. This type of research burrows
with corrections at 29 I.L.M. 1340 (1990) [hereinafter CRC]. The CRC was ratified by
every member of the United Nations except Somalia and the United
States. For details by ratification by state, see U.N. TREATY COLLECTIONS,
http://treatiesun.org/Home.aspx?lang=en (follow "United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS)
hyperlink; then follow "Title Search" hyperlink; search "Convention on the Rights of the
Child"; then follow "See Details" hyperlink for "Convention on the Rights of the Child").
Compliance with the CRC is monitored by the United Nations Committee on the Rights of
the Child. Thailand ratified the CRC in 1992 and the optional protocol in 2006. See CRC,
supra. Each of the topics mentioned in the -poster had its counterpart in the CRC: the
right to an education appears in Article 28; the right to health in Article 24; the right to
receive information and ideas in Article 17; the right to rest and leisure and the right to
participate in cultural life and the arts in Article 31; the right to remain with one's
parents in accordance with their wishes in Article 9; the right to protection from sexual
exploitation in Article 34; and the right to free expression and the communication of
information or views in Articles 12 and 13. See id.
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"down" through planes of legal pluralism. 3 It represents an important
form of transnational research on rights consciousness in the sense that
it demonstrates global legal influences in diverse social and political
settings and suggests how rights formulated in New York, Geneva, or
Beijing can filter down to localized settings--or can be blocked or
resisted.
On the other hand, the poster could also be read as an ironic symbol
of the chronic disconnection between the legal discourses of the state
and the everyday lives and legal consciousness of ordinary citizens-in
Thailand and elsewhere. The ideas contained in the poster seemed to
bear no relationship to the language, conceptual categories, or practices
of the villagers. According to this reading, the poster was an empty
symbol, a meaningless gesture by the government, and most likely it
endorsed an ideology of rights that the government itself did not
sincerely approve. The poster's irrelevance was signified not only by its
derelict condition, but also by the fact that it was affixed to the wall of a
school building that no longer had either students or teachers.
This second reading, which looks at rights consciousness as it
actually manifests itself in everyday interactions within a social arena,
stratum, network, or community, could be called the horizontal
perspective on transnational legalism. Scholars who conduct horizontal
research tend to focus primarily on the shared interpretive practices of
ordinary people 4 and the systems of meaning that are familiar to
them-within villages, neighborhoods, business networks, trade
associations, schools, or other "social fields. '5 The horizontal perspective
does not place any particular conceptual framework in the foreground,
but through observation and open-ended interviews, asks what
discourses are found in particular fields of everyday life and only then
considers the origins of key concepts, ideas, and beliefs that it discovers.
3. "Legal pluralism" refers to the coexistence of multiple legal systems-both officially
recognized and unrecognized-within a common geographical space. See generally M. B.
HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM: AN INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND NEO-COLONIAL LAWS
(1975); John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1986); Sally
Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 869 (1988).
4. The term "ordinary people" in this Article refers to individuals of all social strata
who do not necessarily associate themselves with rights advocacy or rule of law activities.
The term is not meant to refer to a particular socioeconomic class or geographical location
but rather to a methodology of selection by researchers. In this context, "ordinary people"
means individuals who are selected for study on some basis other than their connection to
law, legal advocacy, or legal institutions. Thus, they may range from those who are highly
rights conscious to those who are less conscious of rights and even to those who
affirmatively reject rights.
5. See Sally Falk Moore's discussion of the "semi-autonomous social field" in law and
society research, in SALLY FALK MOORE, LAW AS PROCESS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL
APPROACH 54-81 (1978).
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Generally speaking, the vertical perspective, according to a recent
article by Barbara Yngvesson, exists "inside an imaginary of neoliberal
culture."6 The horizontal perspective, however, is found "in what might
be considered the constitutive outside of neoliberal culture: the invisible
exclusions and nonactions that materialize in the wake of
neoliberalism." 7
Both the vertical and the horizontal perspectives, as I have defined
them, represent essential contributions to the sociolegal study of rights
consciousness, and may also be used in conjunction with one another;
but I hope to show that their premises are quite different and that they
are likely to produce different kinds of conclusions. I shall suggest that
a failure to appreciate these differences may lead to erroneous
understandings of rights consciousness in the global era and may blind
researchers to vitally important developments that are difficult to
discern because they run contrary to commonly held assumptions. In
considering the symbol of the poster in the schoolhouse, it is important
to understand the unique contributions and limitations of both
perspectives.
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF RIGHTS IN THAILAND
Individual rights consciousness derives from the intersections of a
person's life experience with the particular interpretive frameworks
that are available in the social environment. The relevance or
irrelevance of rights depends in large part on how individuals come to
understand their own identities and on the stories they and others tell
to make sense of their lives. Individuals continually construct and
reconstruct their understandings of self as they interact socially and
move forward through new experiences.8 This fluid process of identity
construction is both internally and externally driven. It is a process of
meaning-making through which individuals create a sense of self to
6. Barbara Yngvesson, Border Politics, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIOCULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY (James G. Carrier & Deborah B. Gewertz eds., forthcoming 2012).
7. Id.
8. According to Jerome Bruner, identity construction takes place within a network of
family, friends, and acquaintances with whom individuals interact and "distribute"
various facets of the self, like using different filing cabinets for important documents.
JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 114 (1990). George C. Rosenwald adds that the life
story narratives individuals tell themselves and others make meaning of past experiences
as well as preparing the way for "new living action." George C. Rosenwald, Conclusion:
Reflections on Narrative Self-Understanding, in STORIED LivEs: THE CULTURAL POLITICS
OF SELF-UNDERSTANDING 272-73 (George C. Rosenwald & Richard L. Ochberg, eds., 1992).
The connection between identity construction and rights consciousness is discussed in
ENGEL & MUNGER, supra note 1, at 40-69.
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 19:2
confront the exigencies of life. Identities, however, are also shaped and
constrained by the perceptions of others and by the limited range of
interpretive options found in their social surroundings. In addition,
different social environments make available different laws,
institutions, and procedures, which may be rooted in international,
state, local, or nonofficial systems of legality of various kinds. The term
rights consciousness refers to the ways in which individuals draw upon,
resist, or simply do not consider formal, rights-based legal elements,
whether consciously or unconsciously, in their perceptions and behavior.
Rights consciousness is recursive in that it both shapes and is shaped by
law. Law contributes to identity formation and social interactions, but
law is also created and changed by the rights consciousness of those who
use or do not use it. Rights consciousness, moreover, is not fixed and
immutable. There is not one type of rights consciousness per person.
Rather, research shows that an individual's orientation toward rights
can be highly volatile and may continually change its form and
substance, even in the course of a single conversation.9
This Article explores the uses of vertical and horizontal approaches
to rights consciousness in the study of transnational law, building its
argument on the Thai example with which it began. Before undertaking
this analysis, however, it is necessary in this section to provide a sketch
of the broader sociolegal environment of which the schoolhouse, the
village interviewees, and the northern region of Thailand are a part.
Chiangmai is a city and a province in the modern kingdom of Thailand.
Founded in the late thirteenth century, Chiangmai has long been
regarded as the political and cultural capital of the entire northern
region-which is known as Lanna. Chiangmai Province is one of
seventy-seven in the modern Thai state, each administered from
Bangkok through a complex administrative apparatus that includes
courts, constitutions, 10 and law codes. The origins of the modern Thai
legal system are relatively recent. The total transformation of Siam's"
premodern legal and political framework took place under King Rama
V, who reigned from 1868 to 1910. Rama V and his ruling princes
redesigned the nation's "irrational" and operationally inefficient legal
and administrative structures along European lines and launched a
process of legal codification under the supervision of a drafting
9. See ENGEL & MUNGER, supra note 1, at 12-13.
10. Thailand has had a total of eighteen constitutions since the first was promulgated
in 1932. See generally ANDREW HARDING & PETER LEYLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
OF THAILAND: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS (2011).
11. The name "Siam" was changed to 'Thailand" in 1939. See DAVID K. WYATT,
THAILAND: A SHORT HISTORY 243 (2d ed. 2003).
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committee consisting of Siamese, European, and Japanese specialists. 12
Legal "modernization" in Siam spanned the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries and was influenced substantially by. the French,
German, English, and Japanese legal systems that were familiar to the
Siamese and foreign specialists. Rama V and his princes also
established a system of courts within a new Ministry of Justice that
must have looked quite familiar to European observers. This was no
accident: in this case, familiarity was meant to alleviate rather than to
breed contempt. One of the primary aims of the Siamese rulers was to
keep the imperial powers, England and France, from entering and
colonizing the country under the pretext that they were bringing
modern law to an uncivilized and lawless society. 13
A second aim of the Siamese rulers, which was just as important as
the avoidance of colonization, was to fix the boundaries of the new
nation-state and to extend Siamese power to the semiautonomous
regions of the North, Northeast, and South. The centrally administered
legal system and the new legal and administrative codes were crucial
for achieving this goal. In Chiangmai's Lanna region, for example, a
distinctive legal tradition had long prevailed. Villagers understood
legality primarily in terms of conformity to the norms enforced by a
hierarchical array of local spirits whose authority extended from the
village to the principality. Lanna rulers drew their power and
legitimacy in part from their association with these spirits. Over the
centuries, a legal tradition had developed that incorporated spirit-based
practices into a set of law codes derived from Indian origins. Copies of
these law codes, known as Mangraisat (the dharmadstras of the
12. See DAVID M. ENGEL, CODE AND CUSTOM IN A THAI PROVINCIAL COURT: THE
INTERACTION OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE 24-29 (1978); APIRAT
PETCHSIRI, EASTERN IMPORTATION OF WESTERN CRIMINAL LAW: THAILAND AS A CASE
STUDY 82-87 (1987); TAMARA LOOS, SUBJECT SIAM: FAMILY, LAW, AND COLONIAL
MODERNITY IN THAILAND 59-63 (2006).
13. Law reform under Rama V was "the arena in which Siam's leaders had to prove the
country's modernity." Loos, supra note 12, at 43. Creation of a modern legal system
represented a "strategy of control that helped Siam's leaders claim Siam's status
internationally as fully sovereign." Id. at 45.
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legendary Lanna founder, King Mangrai), 14 have been found in temples
throughout northern Thailand. 15
The "modernization" of Siamese law, led by Rama V and his
successors, should therefore be understood as part of a project designed,
among other things, to curb the power of the traditional Lanna rulers
through administrative reform and to replace the Mangraisat with a
European-style legal regime that could be controlled directly from
Bangkok. The modern discourse of rights entered Siam with the
enactment of these law codes in the early twentieth century. For
example, The Civil and Commercial Code refers to the rights of natural
and juristic persons (Sections 66-67),16 certain rights of debtors and
creditors (Sections 198 and 200),17 the rights and duties of mortgagees
and mortgagors (Sections 722-727),18 and various property rights
(Section 1298).19 The Thai Penal Code refers to an individual's right to
reasonably defend himself or herself (Section 68).20 The Thai Criminal
14. A dharmagiistra, known in Thai as thammasat, is a law text in the classical Indian
Hindu-Buddhist tradition. According to J. Duncan M. Derrett, Dharmagiistra means 'the
teaching (or science) of righteousness,' and includes what the modern European
understands by 'law,' without, however, exhausting that topic .... India, in reality, shares
with Islam and with Judaism the belief that righteousness is an independent science of
greater importance than mere day-to-day administration, and that.., judges, arbitrators,
or others .... would, if properly educated in righteousness, tend or endeavor to give a just
decision. J. DUNCAN M. DERRETT, DHARMA ASTRA AND JURIDICAL LITERATURE 2 (1973).
15. See generally THE LAWS OF KING MANGRAI (MANGRAYATHAMMASART) (Aroonrut
Wichienkeeo & Gehan Wijeyewardene eds. and trans., 1986); A. B. Griswold & Prasert na
Nagara, Epigraphic and Historical Studies, No. 17: The 'Judgements of King Man Ray', 65
J. SiAM Soc'Y 137 (1977); David K. Wyatt, Law and Social Order in Early Thailand. An
Introduction to the Mangraisat, 15 J. SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUD. 245 (1984).
16. Unofficial texts of Thai law codes, including the Civil & Commercial Code, can be
accessed online. See, e.g., THAILAWS, http://thailaws.coml (last visited May 26, 2012). "A
juristic person has rights and duties conformity with the provisions of this Code or of other
law within the scope of its power and duties, or its object as provided by or defined in the
law, regulation or constitutive act." CIV. & COMM. CODE § 66 (2008) (Thai.), available at
http://thailaws.com. "Subject to Section 66, a juristic person enjoys the same rights and is
subject to the same duties as a natural person." Id. § 67.
17. "If several acts of performance are due in such a manner that only one of them is to
be done, the right to elect belongs to the debtor unless otherwise stipulated." Id. § 198. "If
the election is to be made within a period of time, and the party who has the right of
election does not exercise it within such period, the right of election passes to the other
party ..." Id. § 200.
18. Id. §§ 722-27.
19. "Real rights may be created only by virtue of this Code or other laws." Id. § 1298.
20. Any person is to commit any act for defending his own right or other person's right
in order to except from a danger arising out of violence tortuous to the law and such
danger to be imminent, if reasonably having committed under the circumstance, such act
is lawful defense, and such person shall not have a [guilt]. CRIM. CODE § 68 (2003) (Thai.)
available at http://thailaws.com.
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Procedure Code specifies the right of a married woman to refer a
criminal charge without her husband's permission (Section 4),21 the
right of an injured person to bring criminal charges even when the
prosecutor has declined to do so (Section 34),22 and the right of an
injured person to bring a civil suit even when a criminal prosecution has
been undertaken (Section 45).23
The language of rights also appears in the codification of Thai tort
law, which is the primary focus of my research. For example, Title V
("Wrongful Acts") of the Civil and Commercial Code contains many
references to rights, including: Section 421 ("The exercise of a right
which can only have the purpose of causing injury to another person is
unlawfu'),24 Section 446 (nontransferability of the right to make a
claim for nonpecuniary loss),25 Section 448 (the effect of prescription on
the right to bring a tort claim),26 and Section 451 (justifiability of the
use of force to protect a legal right).27
The concept of rights within the modern Thai legal system received
further definition when the absolute monarchy was overthrown in 1932
and the first of a long series of constitutions was enacted. For example,
Chapter II of the Siamese Constitution of 1932 referred to the "Rights
and Duties of the Thai People,"'28 including rights of equality, religion,
person, property, speech, and others:
21. "In a criminal case, if victim is a [married woman], she shall be entitled to institute a
prosecution by herself without having to obtain permission of her husband .... " CRIM. PRoC.
CODE § 4 (2008) (Thai.) available at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/CriminaLProcedure
_Code of Thailand/Provisions.
22. "An order of non-prosecution does not prejudice the victim's right to institute a
prosecution by himself." Id. § 34.
23. "The fact that a prosecution against any offence has been instituted does not
prejudice the victim's right to bring a penal action on the basis of such offence also." Id. §
45.
24. CIV. & COMM. CODE §421 (2008) (Thai.), available at http://thailaws.com.
25. In the case of injury to the body or health of another, or in the case of deprivation of
liberty, the injured person may also claim compensation for the damage that is not
pecuniary loss. The claim is not transferable, and does not pass to the heirs, unless it has
been acknowledged by contract, or an action on it has been commenced. Id. § 446.
26. 'The claim for damages arising from wrongful act is barred by prescription after
one year from the day when the wrongful act and the person bound to make compensation
became known to the injured person, or ten years from the day when the wrongful act was
committed." Id. § 448.
27. A person who uses force for protecting his rights is not liable to make compensation
if under the circumstances the help of the Court or of the proper authorities is not
obtainable in due time and there is danger that, if he does not act immediately, the
realization of his right will be frustrated or seriously impeded. Id. § 451.
28. THAI POLITICS: EXTRACTS AND DOCUMENTS 1932-1957, 99 (Thak Chaloemitiarana,
ed., 1978).
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Section 12. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution,
all persons are equal before the law. Titles acquired by
birth, by bestowal or in any other way do not confer any
privilege whatsoever.
Section 13. Every person enjoys full liberty to profess
any religion or religious creed, and to exercise the form
of worship in accordance with his own belief, provided
that it is not contrary to his civic duties or to public
order or good morals.
Section 14. Subject to the provisions of law, every person
enjoys full liberty of person, dwelling, property, speech,
writing, publication, education, public meeting,
association and profession.29
Sixty-five years and sixteen constitutions later, the so-called
People's Constitution of 1997 represented a high-water mark of
constitutional rights in Thailand. This admirable document, produced
by a large and diverse drafting committee, emerged from nationwide
public consultation in which "countless regional local hearings were
organized to discuss the scope of the enterprise and many fundamental
issues were pondered, debated, drafted, re-drafted and finally decided
upon."30 The 1997 Constitution articulated a broad array of rights.
Indeed, the entirety of Chapter 3 (Sections 26-65) is devoted to an
enumeration of the Rights and Liberties of the Thai People, including:
rights of gender equality (Section 30), rights against torture, brutality,
or cruel and inhumane punishment (Section 31), the right to a
presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings (Section 33), rights of
religious freedom (Section 38), rights of free expression (Section 39), the
right to at least twelve years of education (Section 43), the right of
peaceful assembly (Section 44), the rights of traditional communities to
"conserve or restore their customs, local knowledge, arts, or good culture
of their community" (Section 46), and many others.31 Although this
remarkable document was abrogated after the coup of 2006 and
replaced with Thailand's eighteenth constitution in 2007, at least one
commentator has observed that its spirit and many of its core provisions
did not simply disappear, but have experienced a "constitutional
29. Id. at 99.
30. B.J. TERWIEL, THAILAND'S POLITICAL HISTORY: FROM THE FALL OF AYUTTHAYA TO
RECENT TIMES 289 (2005). See generally HARDING & LEYLAND, supra note 10, at'22-24.
31. CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND (1997).
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afterlife" and can be expected to reappear in future documents.
32
Indeed, the government of the Pheu Thai party, elected in July 2011
and led by Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, favors amending the
2007 constitution to return to the spirit or even the letter of the 1997
constitution.33 If a new constitution emerges from this process, it will be
the nineteenth since 1932.
Recent articulations of constitutional rights in Thailand derive not
just from internal debates and political movements, but also reflect
transnational constitutional influences, such as the trailblazing
processes of public participation in countries such as South Africa.
34
Transnational influences on rights discourses in Thailand have also
been introduced through Thailand's accession to various international
treaties such as the CRC, through Thailand's obligations as a member of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), through the
programs of the World Bank and the United Nations, and through the
advocacy work of NGOs. As we have seen in the example of the
children's rights poster, the Thai government at times disseminates
transnational rights concepts, but when the government does not
promote such rights-or even when it actively opposes them-the mass
media and the Internet can continue to familiarize ordinary people with
them through news coverage, opinion pieces, and blogs. Furthermore,
Thai political parties, cause lawyers, 35 and activists may invoke rights
discourses as they pursue power or social change.
II. PROBLEMATIZING RIGHTS CONSCIOUSNESS
With the expansion and proliferation of rights concepts in Thailand
over the course of the twentieth century, the question of rights
consciousness is of more than academic interest. It has become
32. See Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Afterlife: The Continuing Impact of Thailand's
Postpolitical Constitution, 7 INT'L J. CONST. L. 83, 84 (2009).
33. See Aekarach Sattaburuth, Govt Vows Push to Revise Charter, BANGKOK POST
(Aug. 24, 2011) (Thai.), http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/politics/253145/govt-vows-push-
to-revise-charter. Recent statements by the Pheu Thai leadership have appeared to
support amendment rather than wholesale abrogation of the 2007 constitution. See
PM: No Change to Monarchy Law, BANGKOK POST (Feb. 29, 2012) (Thai.),
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/politics/282186/pm-no-change-to-monarchy-law.
34. See Jeremy Sarkin, The Drafting of South Africa's Final Constitution from a
Human-Rights Perspective, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 69-72 (1999) (including in the process of
public participation education campaigns and public submissions).
35. See Frank Munger, Globalization, Investing in Law, and the Careers of Lawyers for
Social Causes: Taking on Rights in Thailand, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 745, 802 (2009)
(suggesting that cause lawyers in Thailand engage in "ambiguous, Thai-style collaboration
with government," which "blends the rule of law with the social relationships they value,
creating a new culture of governance and opportunities for change").
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important to know how far ordinary people36 have gone toward
incorporating these ideas about rights into their thoughts and actions,
and to what extent rights have actually shaped the identities of citizens
throughout Thailand. Unfortunately, this question has not received
systematic attention from socio-legal scholars and remains difficult to
answer. Certainly the expression of rights has featured prominently in
some of the most important political events of the past half-century,
including those unfolding at the present time. Yet, the leaders of Thai
political movements are not typical of the general citizenry, and their
invocation of rights may not reflect how ordinary people interpret their
experiences and identities.
Socio-legal research literature extending over more than half a
century has taught us to be skeptical of the assumption that rights or
other legal concepts inevitably migrate from law books to the law in
action and has provided countless examples of laws that are ineffective,
ignored, evaded, manipulated, or are otherwise irrelevant to those at
whom they were targeted. In light of this distinguished research
tradition, few observers familiar with socio-legal scholarship would
assume a simple or direct relationship between the proliferation of
formal rights in Thailand and the consciousness or behavior of ordinary
Thai citizens. Nevertheless, discussions of Thai law in the global era
typically highlight these new laws and legal institutions and either
assert or imply that they must signify something, that some sort of
grassroots change in rights consciousness must be in progress, and the
development of laws, legal institutions, and law-related activism must
play some role in individual thought and action. Yet the connection
between transnational legal practices, the expansion of formal rights
within Thailand, and the consciousness of ordinary citizens has, for the
most part, been either assumed or ignored as a problem worth
exploring.
My own research in northern Thailand from the 1970s to the
present suggests that a closer scrutiny of the rights consciousness of
ordinary people may yield some surprising results. My research was not
focused on high profile rights concepts grounded in Thai constitutional
developments or in the international human rights corpus, since asking
people directly about those issues might bias their responses in favor of
a rights-based discourse. The aim of research on rights consciousness is
to detect its presence or absence in the thoughts and actions of
individuals across a range of social interactions. Research that injects
into the interview the very concepts whose existence is being researched
would be methodologically self-defeating.
36. See supra note 4 for definition of the expression "ordinary people."
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I attempted to avoid this problem in two ways. First, I chose a
subject matter-physical injuries-that does not necessarily fall inside
the ambit of "the imaginary of neo-liberal culture."37 Injuries can be
understood within the framework of rights analysis or entirely separate
from it. Second, I did not ask interviewees directly about the legal
implications of the injuries they suffered but instead invited them to
narrate their life stories and to situate their injury experience within
the flow of events from childhood to the present. As they constructed
their narratives, I listened and attempted to discern when and whether
they themselves referred to law and legal rights. By encouraging the
interviewees to frame their accounts using terms and concepts of their
own choosing, I was able to identify the situations in which law and
legal rights were absent as well as when they were present.
The results, which I have described more extensively elsewhere, 38
were surprising and counterintuitive. I had previously conducted
research in Chiangmai in 1975, just forty years after promulgation of
the Thai Civil and Commercial Code and forty-two years after passage
of the first Thai Constitution. My 1975 study of court transcripts,
observation of judicial proceedings, and interviews with village leaders,
litigants, lawyers, and others, led me to conclude that at that time the
formal legal system interacted in complicated, but unacknowledged,
ways with a still-vibrant system of customary laws and practices. 39
Ordinary people preferred to stay away from lawyers and official legal
institutions, sometimes citing the familiar aphorism, "It is better to eat
dog shit than to go to court."40 Most disputes, including injury cases,
were resolved through informal mediation by village authority figures. 4 1
Disputants believed that the locality spirits of the village and the
principality were offended by wrongful acts, and injury victims
demanded for the good of the community that the injurer pay restitution
and provide resources to perform ceremonies to appease the spirits. 42
Occasionally customary negotiations would break down, and in such
instances, the injured party might consider litigation.43 Fellow villagers
understood the choice to step outside the bounds of customary dispute
resolution, because they saw it as another way to enforce the demands
37. Yngvesson, supra note 6.
38. See generally DAVID M. ENGEL & JARUWAN S. ENGEL, TORT, CUSTOM, AND KARMA:
GLOBALIZATION AND LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN THAILAND 95-122 (2010).
39. Id. at 78. Interviews referenced in this Article were conducted in Thai by the
author, with Jaruwan S. Engel. Tapes and Thai language transcriptions are on file with
the author.
40. This expression was recited repeatedly during the initial fieldwork.
41. ENGEL & ENGEL, supra note 38, at 78.
42. Id. at 56-66.
43. Id. at 78.
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of the spirits.44 Typically, the plaintiff would withdraw the suit when
the injurer agreed to a settlement, and it was evident in some cases that
the settlement amount had been determined with reference to
customary norms rather than the provisions of the law codes. 45
Thus, in the 1970s, the Chiangmai Provincial Court was an
institution typically avoided but occasionally used for goals rooted in the
cultural history of Lanna. The place of litigation in the broader dispute
resolution system was widely understood if not universally approved.
Yet nowhere did I observe ordinary people actually embracing the
concept of rights. They did not invoke the law to vindicate their rights
but to promote norms and practices that could be traced back to
premodern Lanna, to spirit worship, and even to the provisions of the
Mangraisat.
I returned to Chiangmai twenty-five years later to assess the rights
consciousness of ordinary citizens during an era of intense global
influences and extensive social, economic, and demographic change at
the turn of the twenty-first century. Consistent with the popular
assumptions about expanding rights consciousness outlined above, I
expected to find that injury victims used official law more readily and
referred to their rights rather than adhering to customary beliefs and
practices. Specifically, I thought my focus on injury litigation would
match the headlines of Thai newspapers and yield a bounty of tort cases
dealing with medical malpractice, automobile accidents, toxic exposures,
products liability, and the like. But none of these expectations were met
either in my study of court documents from 1992 to 1997 or in my
interviews with persons treated for serious injuries in a large
Chiangmai hospital. Available data suggested that injury litigation
rates had, if anything, declined since my earlier research in the 1970s.
This conclusion was suggested by two related findings. First, it appears
that most injuries in Chiangmai are caused by traffic accidents.46
Second, although the number of traffic-related injuries from the 1960s
to the 1990s could not be reliably determined, I did find that the
number of motor vehicles registered in Chiangmai from 1965 to 1997
had increased by nearly 800 percent.4 7 The enormous increase in
vehicles on the highways served as a plausible indicator that the
44. Id.
"45. Id.
46. In my hospital sample of 93 patients, which included nearly all injury victims
admitted to one of the major hospitals in Chiangmai Province over a three-month period,
75.3 percent were injured in traffic accidents.
47. From 1965 to 1997, the number of registered motor vehicles in Chiangmai Province
increased from 8,547 to 677,123. Samut Raingan Satiti Jangwat Chiangmai [Statistical
Reports of Chiangmai Province], NAT'L STAT. OFF. THAI. (1966-1998).
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number of vehicle-related injuries, and hence the number of injuries
overall in Chiangmai, must have increased substantially as well. Yet
the number of tort cases per thousand people had actually remained
about the same-0.071 cases from 1965 to 1974 and 0.088 cases from
1992 to 1997.48 This means that the litigation rate per injury, tort cases
divided by injuries, had very likely declined over the last thirty years of
the twentieth century. The decrease is especially striking if we look only
at personal injury lawsuits and exclude tort actions merely involving
property damage. On average, from 1992 to 1997, out of a population of
more than 1,300,000 people, only eleven personal injury cases per year
were litigated in the Chiangmai Provincial Court.49
Interviews with injury victims substantiated this picture of a
decline in claims. The interviewees made it clear that when ordinary
people suffered serious injuries, they considered the assertion of their
legal rights to be irrelevant and contrary to Buddhist teachings. None of
them consulted a lawyer, filed a tort action, or prosecuted a private
criminal case.50 At the same time, they had become unfamiliar with
village-level customary law and were unable to apply it in nearly all
cases. Obtaining a remedy of any kind from the injurer had become
highly problematic.
What caused this dramatic change in Lanna legal culture, and what
had become of the unspoken but important connection between
customary practices and state law? Global influences transformed
Lanna society in the final years of the twentieth century.5 1 During the
1980s and 1990s, the Thai export-oriented economy boomed, foreign
direct investment increased, and the country became a prime tourist
destination.52 These socioeconomic changes dramatically affected
Lanna. Many younger workers, as we have already seen, left their
villages to take up wage labor in the city of Chiangmai or in Thailand's
central region. Farmland was sold and turned into housing
developments, industrial estates, and shopping centers.53 Although
48. ENGEL & ENGEL, supra note 38, at 102.
49. Id. at 106.
50. The Thai Criminal Procedure Code, Section 28, permits the victim to bring criminal
charges even when the public prosecutor has declined to pursue a case, and some personal
injury victims took advantage of this opportunity. During our earlier research, in which
we surveyed the docket of the Chiangmai Provincial Court in 1965, 1968, 1971, and 1974,
we discovered 8.25 private criminal cases per year involving injury claims. During our
later research, however, in which we surveyed the docket from 1992 to 1997, we found
only 1.33 such cases per year. Id. at 108. This represents a very substantial drop in the
use of private criminal prosecutions by personal injury victims.
51. Id. at 40-45.
52. Id. at 42-44.
53. Id. at 44.
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nearly three-quarters of Chiangmai's citizens still reside in rural
settings, 54 most of the interviewees in our study lived far from their
birth villages and described themselves as cut off from the practices,
beliefs, and rituals that had shaped the lives of their parents and
grandparents. As one injury victim, a middle-aged woman named
Saikham,55 explained:
If we followed the old customs, that would be good. But
we don't know how to do it now. Because we, how should
I say it, we have entered the modern world now. How
can I explain this? The old ways have ended; we don't
know how to do these things. I like them, but I can't do
them.
Lanna legal culture has changed, according to our interviewees,
because injuries no longer occur in integrated village communities. They
no longer offend the guardian spirits. Injury victims do not believe that
the injurer's misconduct affects anyone but themselves. Identity has
become more sharply individuated, and injuries and remedies have lost
their relational and communitarian qualities. While injury victims
might still hope to receive some form of compensation from their
injurers, no one else is thought to have a direct stake in making sure
that the injurer provides a remedy. Community pressure on the injurer
to comply with customary law has all but disappeared. Local mediators
have no authority over disputants who live outside the village.
In the past, spirit worship at the village level was closely linked to
Buddhist beliefs and practices.56 Buddhism remains strong, but it is no
longer tied to particular localities. Buddhist practices, according to our
interviewees, have become more universalized-accessed by radio,
television, books, DVDs, and the Internet. Injury victims invariably
thought their misfortune had been caused by their own karma. For
54. See Key Indicators of the Population and Households: Population and Housing
Census 1990 and 2000, NAT'L STAT. OFF. THAI., http://web.nso.go.th/pop2000/finalrep/
cheingmaifn.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2011).
55. Interviewees quoted in this Article are identified by pseudonyms in order to protect
guarantees of confidentiality offered to them during the fieldwork. The original round of
interviews took place from June to August, 1999. Follow-up conversations with selected
interviewees, including Buajan, Part IV infra, took place in January 2010.
56. For descriptions of the linkages between spirit worship and Buddhism in Thailand,
see generally, RICHARD DAVIS, MUANG METAPHYSICS: A STUDY OF NORTHERN THAI MYTH
AND RITUAL (1984); CHARLES F. KEYES, THE GOLDEN PENINSULA: CULTURE AND
ADAPTATION IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA (1977); SHALARDCHAI RAMITANON, PHI JAO NAI
[SPIRITS OF THE NOBILITY] (2002); S.J. TAMBIAH, BUDDHISM AND THE SPIRIT CULTS IN
NORTH-EAST THAILAND (1970).
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example, one young man believed his injury occurred because of bad
karma he created when he worked in a slaughterhouse. A middle-aged
woman injured by a negligent driver thought her leg was broken
because she had beaten a dog with a stick and broken its leg.57 A farmer
traced her motorcycle accident to the gardening work she did with her
husband-when they tilled the soil they must have inadvertently
injured or killed the tiny creatures that lived underground.
Some interviewees stated that they were suffering now because of
sins committed in a previous life. In fact, they may have injured their
injurers in their former existence. The cycle of injury and counterinjury
would continue through many lifetimes unless one of them ended the
suffering by practicing the Buddhist virtues of compassion and mercy.
Rather than insist on a remedy, they thought it was better to
acknowledge the karmic origins of their misfortune and forgive the
injurer. In this way, they could protect themselves and their family
members against future harm more effectively than by seeking
monetary compensation.
There was nothing new about interpreting one's injuries in terms of
karma. 58 But these injury narratives were unprecedented in that
Buddhist frameworks had now separated completely from village-based
remedy practices based on spirit worship. Buddhism, cut loose from
spirit worship, seemed to the interviewees to require them to absorb the
injury without any demand for substantial compensation from the
injurer. As one interviewee told us:
People in Lanna, maybe we just have meritorious
spirits. That's just how we are. If something is destined
to happen, then we just let it go. This has to do with our
moral code, the ethics we learned in school when the
religious teachers instructed us . . . Buddhism teaches
people to do only good, and we keep that sort of thing in
our minds at all times. That's why our society is like
this.
57. This case, involving a woman I call "Buajan," will be discussed in greater detail in
Part IV infra.
58. The teachings of Theravada Buddhist monks in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries had emphasized the connection between karma and human suffering of all
kinds. The concept of karmic causation has remained fundamental to Thai Buddhism.
KEYES, supra note 56, at 90. See also, PETER A. JACKSON, BUDDHADkSA: THERAVADA
BUDDHISM AND MODERNIST REFORM IN THAILAND 20 (2003) (Thai Buddhism has generally
emphasized karma and "correct action" in order to achieve "right results.").
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Interviewees agreed that injuries caused by the victim's own bad
karma should be addressed by adherence to Buddhist teachings. The
aggressive pursuit of a remedy will only perpetuate suffering and cause
more conflict and pain in the future.
Contrary to what one might expect, the disappearance of a
customary law of injuries at the village level did not lead to an increase
in rights claims among the interviewees in this study. Although injury
cases were no longer resolved at the village level, injury victims did not
view official Thai law as an acceptable substitute for village customary
law. The modest stream of litigated injury cases in the 1960s and 1970s
was reduced to a trickle by the late 1990s. None of our hospital
interviewees resorted to the formal legal system. The discourse of rights
has not emerged as a substitute for traditional Lanna legal discourses.
III. VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL PERSPECTIVES
Why is it that popular assumptions about the expansion of rights-
based norms and institutions during this global era do not accurately
describe the rights consciousness of ordinary people in northern
Thailand? Why does the distinctive transformation of social norms and
legal-religious ideology I encountered in my research tend to fly beneath
the radar, leading to wholly unexpected developments in a society that
appears on the surface to be moving steadily in the direction of liberal
legalism? What tools of socio-legal research are available to detect and
measure such counterintuitive changes?
There can be no question that law and society researchers have
entered the global age and are now seeking new ways to study a world
in which formal laws and legal institutions can no longer be associated
exclusively-or even primarily-with the nation-state. Studies of
transnational, subnational, or anti-national legal practices and
institutions have undermined the exclusive identification of the state
with the law that we study. The expression "law and society" itself has
become uncertain. We cannot assume that "law" refers either to state
law or to alternative localized systems of customary practice and
dispute resolution. We cannot assume that "society" refers to clearly
bounded local communities or to national groups-Japanese society,
Italian society, American society, or Thai society-which were often the
intended referents of law and society scholars. Today, "society" may just
as well apply to transnational fields of interaction, relational networks,
or international organizations.
Some of the most interesting and exciting work by socio-legal
scholars in recent years explores this broader and more complex global
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understanding of legal institutions, practices, actors, and influences.5 9
One of the recurring foci is the role of rights, which are presumed to be
the essential foundation of modern law. 60 Much of this research reflects
what I have called a vertical perspective. That is, it attempts to theorize
and sometimes to offer empirical descriptions of the transnational flow
of liberal legal norms, institutions, and practices, and it asks under
what circumstances such flows are facilitated or impeded at the
national, subnational, or local levels.
One insightful review of this type of research is offered by Terence
C. Halliday and Pavel Osinsky, 61 who suggest that "a theory of legal
globalization" must focus both on the key actors who "create, propagate,
and receive global norms and organizations" and on the locales in which
these activities take place: "it will explicate where global norms and
templates originate and how they are conveyed to sites across the world
where they are differentially integrated into local institutions and
practices." 62 Researchers, according to Halliday and Osinsky, must
consider not only the internal dynamics of this process but also the
resistance it encounters along the way. For example, "[l]iberal
constitutionalism" confronts such obstacles as "[1]ocal political elites,
'Big Man' regimes in Africa, authoritarian rulers, military dictators, and
religious hierarchies .... "63 Thus, the authors conclude, observers must
always be skeptical "about excessive claims made of globalization and
its impact" and must remain aware of "the rampant contingency of
globalization. '64
Two features of this nuanced treatment of legal globalization are
worth noting in the context of our analysis of the distinctive features of
the vertical perspective: First, the research question is posed in terms of
"impact." Liberal legalism is the active agent and the societies of the
global south are the potential recipients of this dynamic force. The
question is, therefore, the readiness of actors in these societies to accept
these legal practices, and the conditions that are required for acceptance
to occur. Second, the factors that prevent acceptance tend to be
constructed negatively as irrational and undemocratic-such as "Big
Men," despots, or theocrats.
59. See, e.g., Terence C. Halliday & Pavel Osinsky, Globalization of Law, 32 ANN. REV.
OF SOC. 447 (2006).
60. See, e.g., Jean-Marc Coicaud, Conclusion, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 178, 193 (Jean-Marc Coicaud, Michael W. Doyle & Anne-Marie Gardner eds.,
2003) ("Law is based upon the recognition and implementation of rights.").
61. Halliday & Osinsky, supra note 59.
62. Id. at 450.
63. Id. at 464.
64. Id. at 466.
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This form of research, as Halliday and Osinsky characterize it, is
not designed to ask how ordinary people in societies of the global south
may be working actively rather than passively to construct alternatives
to liberal legalism; nor does vertical perspective research in itself
attempt some independent evaluation of whether the alternatives they
devise are invariably less beneficial than rights-based regimes. The lack
of attention to alternative legalities external to liberal legalism may
result in part from the exhaustion of a lengthy debate over cultural
relativism versus universality in the human rights field, as well as a
widespread rejection of the self-serving argument of "Asian values" put
forth by repressive and undemocratic regimes in Southeast Asia and
elsewhere in the region. But it is not necessary to embrace relativism or
so-called Asian values to raise the empirical question of how ordinary
people actually think and behave.
Research reflecting the vertical perspective has opened new vistas
for the field of law and society and has fundamentally redefined many of
our central terms and topics. Yet our enthusiasm for studies of this kind
is not always accompanied by a clear sense of what vertical
methodologies can and cannot tell us about rights consciousness within
the general population. In particular, the vertical perspective in itself
provides no check on the assumption that transnationalism has
necessarily brought an increase in the role of law in everyday life
(except when impeded by antidemocratic obstacles), an assumption
fueled by the mass media and popular mythology as well as by some
scholars. As the Thai example suggests, the actual situation may be
quite different. It is one thing to suggest that legal ideas, institutions,
and practices can travel from the global North to the global South, from
the centers of cultural production in Europe and North America to
societies that are portrayed as the recipients of the ideas and
institutions of liberal legalism. But it is quite another thing to conclude
that they tend to take root and flourish once they arrive or to
predominate over the legal orders they encounter. Moreover, the
characterization of so-called receiving nations as relatively passive
when it comes to cultural production can be highly misleading, since
many of these same countries have produced some of the most dynamic
forms of legality, or antilegality, in our era. Thailand is a case in point.
A related problem is that very often those who advocate the
transnational expansion of rights tend to provide their own narrative
about the inevitability of a growth in rights consciousness. Such
narratives certainly merit scholarly attention, but should they
necessarily be taken as descriptively valid? For example, in a much
quoted speech delivered to the U.N. General Assembly in 1999, then-
Secretary-General Kofi Annan described "a world transformed by geo-
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political, economic, technological and environmental changes" and
contended that, in that world,
[t]he State is now widely understood to be the servant of
its people, and not vice versa. At the same time,
individual sovereignty-and by this I mean the human
rights and fundamental freedoms of each and every
individual as enshrined in our Charter-has been
enhanced by a renewed consciousness of the right of
every individual to control his or her own destiny.
65
What exactly is this statement meant to convey about the status of
rights consciousness in a transnational world? Annan is hopeful and
supportive of the spread of rights globally, but he also offers an
empirical claim about changes that are occurring on the ground,
changes that could be observed in the minds and practices of people who
live in villages and neighborhoods around the world. What would be the
basis for this empirical claim and how could it be substantiated?
Annan's statement finds its counterpart in the writings of many
scholars who study transnational legal phenomena. For example,
Lawrence Friedman and Rogelio P~rez-Perdomo, in their book on global
influences in Latin America and Latin Europe, observe, "[e]xposure to
foreign influences weakens the links of local culture, evades tradition,
accentuates individualism, and increases resort to law for the
affirmation of individual rights."66 The line between the hortatory and
inspirational language of the Secretary-General and the analytic
language of socio-legal scholars who study these processes can become
blurred, but whether the observer's purpose is prescriptive or
descriptive, it is evident that the vertical perspective alone cannot do
the job.
The innovative work of Sally Engle Merry on transnational human
rights and gender violence provides a helpful example of the uses and
limitations of the vertical perspective in the hands of a scholar who is
sensitive to the issues raised in this Article. In a recent book,6 7 Merry
65. Kofi Annan, Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to the General
Assembly (Sept. 20, 1999), http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/statmentssearch_
full.asp?statID=28 (last visited Dec. 18, 2011).
66. Rogelio P6rez-Perdomo & Lawrence Friedman, Latin Legal Cultures in the Age of
Globalization, in LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND
LATIN EUROPE 5 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Rogeio Pdrez-Perdomo eds., 2003) (citations
omitted).
67. SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE (2006).
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presents what she calls a "deterritorialized ethnography" 68 focusing on a
single human rights topic-gender violence-in its transnational legal
context. Merry's research took her from U.N. agencies in North America
and Europe to NGO offices and conferences in various world regions, as
well as to grassroots activists in Asia and the Pacific. Her research was
vertical in the sense that it traced the movement of a concept-that
women have rights under international law, which are violated when
they are subjected to gender violence-from the most lofty and
overarching levels of legal production to the local level of village
practices.
Studies of this kind spatialize law in a distinctive way, mapping it
in terms of higher and lower regions. Typically, the higher regions are
associated with greater power and influence and with post-
Enlightenment ideas about law. Their influence tends to flow downward
rather than upward, from rational, rights-based concepts of law to
localized settings in which non-Enlightenment ideas about law hold
sway. The spatialization and directionality of this research model
explain my use of the term vertical to describe it. Merry, of course, is
fully aware of the cultural assumptions that underlie this framework
and is careful to account for them in her analysis.69 We might go one
step further, however, and suggest that the vertical model also has an
implicit normative preference. Those who adopt it tend to assume that
rights are right. Merry critiques the universalism-relativism debate of
the 1990s 70 and attempts to go beyond it, yet in doing so she explicitly
incorporates in her analysis some of the same prorights values as the
actors she studies. While proceeding carefully and remaining sensitive
to the problems of cultural hegemony, Merry concludes with a
thoughtful but firm endorsement of the very flow of rights concepts that
she documents ethnographically:
Despite drawbacks in the way the concept of human
rights has been developed and used, it is still the only
global vision of social justice currently available. With
all its flaws, it is the best we have. It provides at least
some constraint on the operation of markets and offers a
potentially powerful tool to those who learn to use it.
Like the language of law itself, it serves those in power
68. See id. at 28-30.
69. See, e.g., id. at 1-35 (providing a nuanced discussion of "culture and
transnationalism").
70. See id. at 8.
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but is always in danger of escaping its bounds and
working in a genuinely emancipatory way.7
If I am correct that the vertical model reflects both a distinctive
spatialization of law in the global era and a normative preference for the
cultural flows it documents, what is the result of research that relies on
this model? More specifically, what can it tell us about the rights-
consciousness of ordinary people? Merry's study is exemplary in this
regard, since she considers both the heuristic power and the limits of
the vertical research model. 72 In brief, she argues that the downward
dissemination of rights consciousness leads to a double bind.73 To
become effective at the local levels, rights must be translated into
discourses familiar to ordinary people. Yet the problem faced by rights
advocates is that too much translation or adaptation will neutralize
rights and deprive them of the power that derives from the very fact of
their externality in relation to the local culture:
To blend completely with the surrounding social world is
to lose the radical possibilities of human rights. It is the
unfamiliarity of these ideas that makes them effective in
breaking old modes of thought .... On the other hand, it
is only when they take a familiar form that they are
readily adopted 7 4
If rights must be translated and adapted to become active at the
grass roots level, yet must also retain their unfamiliarity and
externality, what is the likelihood that ordinary people will actually
incorporate them into their legal consciousness? What are the chances
that individual identities and life narratives will reflect the influence of
rights? The methodology of Merry's study does not attempt to measure
the popular acceptance of rights within the locales she studies, but she
does offer some cautionary observations. She notes that the translation
of international human rights in particular localities "occurs at a
relatively superficial level, as a kind of window dressing."75 She adds
71. Id. at 231.
72. See, e.g., id. at 29 ("The challenge is to . .. track the information flows that
constitute global discourses, and to mark the points at which competing discourses
intersect in the myriad links between global and local conceptions and institutions ....
This is hard to pull off on a global stage.").
73. Id. at 221 ("The failure to fully indigenize these ideas [of gender equality and
freedom from violence] impedes their spread, yet to do so would undermine their potential
to challenge social inequalities.").
74. Id. at 178.
75. Id. at 177.
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that "the impact is greater on transnational elites and middle-level
NGO activists than on people at the grass roots."76 Elsewhere, she has
observed, "[a]s translators vernacularize these transnational
institutions and ideas, they promote this modernist view, with its
emancipatory and homogenizing effects. Whether or not they achieve an
expanded human rights subjectivity is far more uncertain." 77
In deploying the vertical model of research on transnational law,
Merry is careful not to make unwarranted claims about the rights
consciousness of ordinary people that would exceed the methodological
limits of her research design. Yet it is difficult for scholars and other
observers-most of whom (myself included) share the normative
preference for widespread rights dissemination-to avoid implying that
the vertical phenomena they document are associated with an
expansion of rights along a horizontal axis. It is easy to imagine a
researcher in this tradition selecting Chiangmai as a site for the study
of transnational human rights and local activism. In Chiangmai, the
researcher would find dozens of NGOs working energetically in many
different ways to translate rights into local discourses and thereby
promote the ideology of liberal legalism. Some NGOs are aimed at the
protection of women's rights, including the prevention of domestic
violence, which is the subject of Merry's research. 78 Others address a
plethora of rights concerns, such as the rights of migrant workers,79
persons with disabilities,80 the LGBT community,8' and young women
who have been the victims of human trafficking.8 2
Although many of the Chiangmai-based activists are Americans and
Europeans, a number of them are Thai, and the programs in which they
work are home grown. Moreover, many Thai faculty members at Chiang
Mai University8 3 (CMU) labor tirelessly in rural and urban settings to
promote the cause of human rights, often at great personal risk and
expense. For example, Virada Somswasdi, the founder of the Women's
76. Id. at 178.
77. Sally Engle Merry, Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the
Middle, 108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 38, 49 (2006).
78. See, e.g., ASIA PACIFIC FORUM ON WOMEN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT,
http://www.apwld.org (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
79. See, e.g., MAP FOUNDATION, http://www.mapfoundationcm.org/eng (last visited Apr.
15, 2012).
80. See, e.g., FOUNDATION TO ENCOURAGE THE POTENTIAL OF DISABLED PERSONS,
http://www.disabled.infothai.com (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
81. See, e.g., MPLUS FOUNDATION, http://www.mplusthailand.com (last visited Apr. 15,
2012).
82. See, e.g., ANTI-TRAFFICKING COORDINATION UNIT NORTHERN THAILAND
(TRAFCORD), http://trafcord.org/content/about-trafcord (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
83. Chiang Mai is an alternate English transliteration of Chiangmai.
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Studies Center at CMU, trains paralegals from village settings
throughout northern Thailand, where they return and work in their
own communities to promote women's rights in particular and human
rights in general.8 4
In an article about legal consciousness in Thailand, Frank Munger
discusses one example in which political activists drew on rights-based
concepts to mobilize grass roots opposition to construction and
management of the Pak Mun Dam in Thailand's northeast region.85
Villagers whose homes and livelihoods were affected by the dam
collaborated with NGO activists to organize a series of protests from the
1990s to the present, citing not only the international human rights
issues at stake but also what Munger describes as deep-rooted cultural
values related to environmental protection. 86 He suggests that
environmental protests of this kind, drawing on international rights-
based discourses,, affected the drafting of the 1997 Constitution, which
"provides special protections for environmental rights and for public
participation in environmental decision-making." 87 Thus, in Merry's
terms, the Pak Mun Dam protests illustrate one area in which
transnational rights were successfully translated into a set of concepts
that were meaningful to villagers and which they in turn could mobilize
to affect the framework of state law. Significantly, Munger concludes
that "social justice among the rural poor was grounded in the unique
importance of the environment rather than a general belief in rights or
democracy." 88
The Pak Mun Dam controversy, and others like it, provide valuable
case studies in the vertical tradition, demonstrating how actors at the
grass roots level translate and deploy rights concepts formulated at the
international level to provide leverage for effective political action. What
the vertical perspective is not designed to tell us in such cases, however,
is the horizontal breadth of this form of legal consciousness. To what
extent have villagers generally in northeast Thailand, or persons
throughout Thai society, actually translated or otherwise integrated
rights concepts into their sense of self, their understandings of society,
or their perceptions of environmental and other issues? A different
methodology would be required to answer this somewhat different
question, and researchers would need to conduct interviews and
84. See Paralegal Training, WOMEN'S STUDIES CENTER, http://wsc.soc.cmu.ac.thl
paralegal.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
85. Frank Munger, Culture, Power, and Law: Thinking About the Anthropology of
Rights in an Era of Globalization, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 817, 836 (2007).
86. Id. at 835.
87. Id. at 837.
88. Id. at 838.
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observations not only with individuals who participated in these
organized protests but also with those who did not.
I am certain that a researcher employing the vertical model could
find many other examples in Chiangmai and throughout Thailand of the
processes of dissemination and vernacularization that Merry has traced
in India, China, Fiji, Hawai'i and elsewhere.8 9 Additionally, a researcher
could show how concepts and practices originating in elite international
conferences and organizations have filtered down to ground level in
Thailand. This vertical perspective on transnational legalism has great
value and is valid and accurate in its own way. But there is one thing it
cannot tell us. Research on the dramatic proliferation of these activities
in Thailand cannot tell us, in Merry's words, whether they "achieve an
expanded human rights subjectivity" among significant numbers of
people in various types of social settings, across other fields of social
interaction, or within broader social classes or strata.90
Why is this a problem? Why is it important to specify so carefully
the limitations of vertical methodologies when they do not incorporate
horizontal elements to investigate forms of consciousness that may
feature a variety of discourses other than or in addition to liberal
legalism? Without this kind of methodological self-scrutiny, there is a
heightened risk of getting things wrong. We tend to believe-and most
of us want to believe-that rights consciousness is continually
expanding. But the Thai example suggests that, despite superficial
indications to the contrary and despite increased activity by some rights
advocates, rights consciousness may actually be contracting as a direct
result of globalization. If our research does not extend outside the
boundaries of the conceptual system we are studying, then we will have
little sense of whether and in what social settings that system is
growing or shrinking relative to rival conceptual systems. We may be
surprised, for example, by the unexpected realization that a broad-based
religious resurgence has far more appeal to ordinary people in some
social settings-such as the Thai urban middle class-than does the
ideology of rights.91
We have made this kind of mistake before, but socio-legal scholars
seem particularly well qualified to guard against such misreadings-as
long as we maintain our historic commitment to distinguishing between
the normative dimensions of law and its empirical manifestations. The
89. MERRY, supra note 67, at 31-35.
90. Id. at 49.
91. See Apinya Fuengfusakul, Empire of Crystal and Utopian Commune: Two Types of
Contemporary Theravada Reform in Thailand, 8 J. SOC. ISSUES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 153
(1993) (discussing contemporary Thai religious movements among the urban middle
class).
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need is apparent in Thailand, where observers tend to assume that
constitutional rights are meaningful to ordinary people and that there is
a growing tendency not only among the urban middle class but even
among the predominantly rural population to invoke rights discourse
and make use of the new institutions for securing those rights. But it
would be better to present these assertions as research questions rather
than conclusions. As Anna Tsing has observed, "[i]n globalization
theories, we have confused what should be questions about the global
ramifications of new technologies and social processes with answers
about global change." 92 It would be a serious mistake to read social
behavior through the lens that is most familiar to, and preferred by, the
observer rather than asking what ideas, values, and conceptual
frameworks are meaningful to the actors themselves. The result could
be a fundamental misinterpretation of the current situation facing Thai
society, as well as a strong likelihood of error in our predictions for the
future.
IV. RIGHTS CONSCIOUSNESS AND IDENTITY
Law and society research for many years has challenged the
assumption that the norms and procedures of official law translate
themselves unproblematically into the everyday practices of ordinary
people. The relationship between formal rights and legal consciousness
is always complex and seldom predictable. Countless studies of legal
rights and the law in action have, however, yielded some fundamental
insights. Law and society research has consistently demonstrated that
legal rights are very often either unfamiliar to or are deliberately
rejected by their intended beneficiaries; that other value systems or
normative arrangements tend to be prized more highly than the law;
that potential claimants often view the pursuit of legal rights and
remedies as destructive of important relationships; and that lumping is
the default mode of conflict resolution. 93
How relevant are these axiomatic findings to law and society
research on rights consciousness in the global era? I suggested earlier in
92. Anna Tsing, Conclusion: The Global Situation, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF
GLOBALIZATION: A READER 453, 476 (Jonathan Xavier Inda & Renato Rosaldo eds., 2002).
93. A vast research literature documents the widespread tendency to subordinate
rights claims to relational considerations or to other systems of norms and values. See,
e.g., Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat, Studying How Law Matters: An Introduction, in
How DOES LAw MArrER? 1 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat, eds., 1998); Marc Galanter,
Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974); Stuart Macaulay, Law and the Behavioral Sciences: Is There Any
There There?, 6 L. & POL'Y 149 (1984).
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this Article that rights consciousness emerges from the intersection of
individual identity construction and the discourses available in the
social environment for dealing with experience and conflict. 94 Tracking
the transformations of rights consciousness over an individual's life
experience may allow researchers to incorporate both vertical and
horizontal elements and thereby avoid exaggerated conclusions about
the role rights actually play for ordinary people. This section provides
an illustration of the use of life story narratives in research on rights
consciousness. It traces the story of Buajan, an accident victim in
Chiangmai, during a critical ten-year span in her life. Buajan's story
reveals how rights discourse and knowledge of formal legal institutions
can be modified by religious and other world views, which ultimately
prevailed over law in her thoughts and actions.
Buajan, a middle-aged woman from a rural background, moved to
the city of Chiangmai some years ago. After her arrival, she engaged in
a series of low-wage jobs, most recently as a cook in the restaurant of a
local hotel. When we spoke with her in 1999, she was still recovering
from painful surgery for a serious injury to her leg. The injury occurred
while she was standing next to a pork stand near the side of a road.
There, a car driven carelessly by an elderly man ran her over, then
backed up and struck her again. As she told the story in 1999, the old
man, whom she called "Uncle," acknowledged his responsibility for the
injury and offered a payment of 20,000 baht along with a promise to
"clear" all her expenses. When the hospital released her, however, Uncle
rejected any further reimbursement of Buajan's costs, arguing that
everything had been included in his initial payment. Buajan tried to file
a complaint with the police, but they turned her away on the grounds
that the parties had already reached a private settlement.
During our first interview, Buajan's description of the injury
revealed the multiplicity of causal explanations available in her social
environment, as well as her sense of self, her remembered past, and her
aspirations for the future. As we have described elsewhere, 95 she framed
her injury in multiple ways, shifting from one perspective to another
with no difficulty or sense of inconsistency. The diversity of interpretive
frames reflected the broad array of conceptual systems-including but
not limited to rights discourse-that were available horizontally to
Buajan. She initially asserted that a ghost in a nearby tree caused her
injury, but at another point she blamed an ancestral spirit that had
been offended by the sexual impropriety of a young relative. At yet
another moment in our conversation, she said that the injury was
94. See supra note 8.
95. ENGEL & ENGEL, supra note 38, at 21-32.
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caused by her own bad karma resulting from misdeeds in this life and in
past lives. At still another point, she cited the negligence of Uncle, and
of herself.
Buajan's belief in supernatural causes derived from the Lanna spirit
practices of her childhood, which she described as an important part of
her identity. But after she moved from her rural home, she found
herself separated from her birth community and from the spirits and
authority figures who could enforce customary norms against her
resistant injurer. In the place of village-based spirit practices, the more
abstract norms of Buddhism had expanded and come to predominate in
her spiritual life. Buddhism was central to her sense of self, and it was
primarily through the lens of Buddhism that she accounted for the
injury she received. For example, she told us that she had once struck a
dog and broken its leg; but now the karmic consequences of her bad
deed had caught up with her and her own leg was broken. Moreover, she
may have injured "Uncle" in a past life, creating bad karma that
resulted in his injuring her in their present incarnation.
A purely Buddhist perception of her injury might have led Buajan to
blame herself for the injury and seek a solution in the form of merit-
making to ward off future harm. Moreover, by refraining from the
aggressive pursuit of a remedy, she could demonstrate the Buddhist
virtues of compassion, mercy, and nonattachment, thus adding to her
store of merit and protecting against future harm to herself and her
family.
Buajan, however, viewed her injury through yet another lens. She
also saw herself in legal terms as the innocent victim of a negligent
driver who was too old and sick to have been behind the wheel in the
first place. In this interpretive frame, she was a woman whose rights
had been violated, although she never spoke of rights herself. Offering
one of the only references to law in all of our interviews, she told us that
she had informed Uncle during their negotiations that she could file a
lawsuit if she were so inclined. Yet, she admitted, she did not trust the
law enough to pursue her sense of a legal violation. She told us that
poor people like herself could never use the law to obtain a remedy
against wealthy and influential people like Uncle: "I never filed a legal
complaint. Even if I had, he could have turned it all'around and made
me out to be the one in the wrong." In 1999, Buajan was angry and
frustrated. She felt she had been treated unjustly, but in the end she
relied on her belief that the law of karma rather than the law of torts or
the criminal law was the most effective way to hold her injurer
accountable.
Ten years later, when we spoke again with Buajan, her sense of
identity had clearly changed with the passage of time and so had the
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story she told about her injury. Much had happened to her during the
intervening years. Her physical recovery had been slow and painful, and
she had been forced to leave her job. One of her children had died, her
husband had become seriously ill and incapacitated, and Buajan herself
had undergone surgery for a growth on her uterus. She was forced to
work as a janitor, but that had proved beyond her physical capacity, and
by the time we spoke she was supporting her family by selling food from
a mobile cart in the evenings. She had become even more devout and
read religious texts studiously. One evening, while reading a book about
Jao Mae Kuan Im, the popular Goddess of Mercy, she fell asleep and
had a dream:
I saw an old man. In the dream, I was lost and couldn't
find my way home. I was hungry and begged him for
some rice. He reached into his shoulder bag, this bald
guy in my dream, and gave me some very black rice to
eat. It caught in my throat, and I began to choke. That's
when I woke up.
Buajan interpreted the dream as a sign that she had behaved
improperly toward Uncle in her dispute with him over compensation.
She had spoken to him in anger and had been too aggressive--one
might say too law-oriented-in seeking payment for her costs and her
lost wages. From the perspective of the Buddhist teachings that had
increasingly guided her life, she now realized that all the misfortune she
had suffered in the aftermath of her accident had resulted from her
failure to respond to her injury in accordance with thamma [dharma].96
Armed with this realization, Buajan made a remarkable decision.
She got on her motorcycle and rode to Uncle's house, two years after he
had run her over. Buajan planned to beg for his forgiveness. She wanted
to perform a blessing with lustral waters, the dam hua ceremony, and
express regret for her actions. She described her intentions by stating, "I
would have told him, Uncle, I truly apologize for speaking abusively to
you. I used very strong language." This dramatic meeting, however, in
which the innocent victim would have apologized to the negligent
injurer for asserting her legal interests too aggressively, was not to take
place. Uncle's younger relatives intercepted Buajan at the door and
96. The dictionary definition of thamma (or tham) is "Buddhist teaching,
righteousness, dharma." MARY R. HAAS, THAI-ENGLISH STUDENTs DICTIONARY 253 (1964).
Thamma or dharma is a fundamental concept in traditional Hindu-Buddhist thought. It
refers to the teachings of the Buddha and also "signifies the eternal laws which maintain
the world." ROBERT LINGAT, THE CLASsICAL LAw OF INDIA 3 (1973).
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refused to bring her to see Uncle, fearing that she had come to demand
more money.
Nevertheless, Buajan's effort to resolve the conflict by a ritual
display of her piety provides a vivid example of her reinterpretation
over time of her sense of self and of the meaning of events that had
occurred in her life. Instead of characterizing Uncle as a haughty and
stingy member of the social elite, she now perceived him in different
terms: "He was really like an older relative. If he hadn't said anything
bad about me, I would have respected him. I would have loved him like
a father. I miss having that kind of relationship with anyone." As
Buajan reflected on her relationship with Uncle:
I just came to understand the accident . . . . Looking
back on it now, I think it was karma .... I think that in
a previous life I must have done something to him and it
was coming back to me. I didn't want us to have this
connection in future lives. That was my belief. So I made
merit for him.
In retelling the story of her accident ten years later, Buajan also
referred to facts she had omitted in her original narrative. She now
acknowledged that, shortly after the accident, Uncle not only offered a
payment of 20,000 baht but also knelt and bowed his head to her feet,
saying, "Child, you don't have to report this to the police. I'll take care of
everything." For an elder to bow down in this way to a woman of
"inferior" age and social status was highly unusual. Yet his gesture did
not dissuade Buajan from attempting to file a police report after he
failed to fulfill his promises, and in Buajan's view, tried to intimidate
her by referring to his connections in high places.
In short, Buajan's narrative and its transformation over a ten-year
period illustrates the fluidity of rights consciousness and its tendency to
change over time as individuals interpret their experiences within the
discursive frameworks they find available in their social environments.
For Buajan, the thought of legal recourse surfaced briefly during her
initial interaction with Uncle, but it was submerged by other discourses
and interpretive frames, leaving only a residue of dissatisfaction and
frustration. Ten years later, even the brief insistence on her legal
interests now appears to Buajan to have been a disastrous mistake.
Viewed entirely through the lens of Buddhist teachings, her initial
pursuit of a remedy now appears to have precipitated even more
suffering, illness, and death. She longs for the opportunity to make
amends, to perform a sacred ritual for the old man, and to change their
relationship from one of self-interested adversarialism to one of love.
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Buajan's story exemplifies how identity and individual experience
can link up with particular discourses to reshape rights consciousness.
In this example, rights consciousness includes the possibility of
rejecting, as well as embracing, rights. Buajan's initial, hesitant
reference to the law was followed in our conversation ten years later by
a more emphatic rejection, which resulted from an increased
commitment to Buddhism in relation to alternative discourses-as well
as a series of tragic misfortunes in Buajan's life. The emergence of this
distinctive form of rights consciousness has no place in the usual
accounts of a global expansion of liberal legalism. Even in the Thai
context, it is difficult to reconcile the evolution of Buajan's rights
consciousness with the widespread reporting of increased litigiousness,
rights-based political movements, the activities of NGOs, and the
central role of constitutional rights in modern Thai society.
Buajan's story illustrates how a horizontal perspective can
supplement the predominantly vertical view of rights consciousness in
Thailand and elsewhere. By listening to narratives such as hers, and by
watching them evolve and transform themselves over time, it is possible
to step outside the confines of an exclusively vertical perspective, while
still acknowledging its heuristic potential. Instead of tracing only the
increased flow of rights concepts from one level to another, such
combined approaches consider the full range of concepts that are
evident in the narratives of ordinary people. These approaches can
identify rights-based concepts when and if they emerge, but they can
also place them in relation to other frameworks that may prove far more
important to ordinary people. In this way, the actual reach of rights,
and their tendency to expand or contract in relation to other discourses,
can be meaningfully assessed.
CONCLUSION
The poster on the schoolhouse wall in the small village outside
Chiangmai City represented a nexus point for the vertical and
horizontal perspectives on rights consciousness. From a vertical
perspective, the poster illustrated the processes of translation and
adaptation through which rights concepts originating in distant but
prestigious international organizations became familiar images and
words transmitted by the national government to the grassroots level.
From a horizontal perspective, however, the poster illustrated
something quite different-the futility of relying on rights to change the
thoughts and actions of the villagers, who probably paid the poster little
heed. Interviews conducted that day by my students revealed that the
villagers tended to share Buajan's disregard for the rights concepts
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articulated by the poster, and for reasons similar to hers. Indeed, many
local residents had, like Buajan, already emigrated from this village to
live and work elsewhere. In their new homes, far from their birth
community, they would have found that customary village norms no
longer had much relevance or utility in their lives, yet my research
suggests that they would not have viewed liberal legalism as an
attractive substitute. Thus, the perspective on rights consciousness
afforded by Buajan's story, and by interviews pursued horizontally
across a community or other social field, may underscore the
disconnection between the lofty ideals expressed in the poster and the
actual views and practices of ordinary people.
For those who might adhere only to the vertical perspective, a
different conclusion could easily have been drawn. The poster could
have been viewed in connection with numerous other constitutional,
statutory, and institutional advances as well as the activities of a
growing number of individuals and organizations that advocate the
cause of rights in Thailand. The poster, from that perspective, could be
interpreted as yet another advance for liberal legalism, a cause that
most of us would probably desire for the citizens of Thailand.
In this Article, I have not argued that such a trend would be
unwelcome-quite the reverse, I see many ways in which the advance of
rights could help to resolve some of Thailand's most pressing problems.
Rather, I have urged the importance of distinguishing carefully between
a normative preference for rights and a grounded effort to answer the
empirical question of whether rights play a meaningful role in the
consciousness of ordinary people. To answer this question, I have
suggested researchers cannot remain inside what Yngvesson calls the
"imaginary of neoliberal culture"97 but must also step outside and take
an external-horizontal-view of the entire range of conceptual
frameworks available to people in particular social settings. Researchers
must watch and listen as individuals navigate among these frameworks
over time as circumstances change. Only by combining horizontal and
vertical approaches can researchers place the project of liberal legalism
in its broader social context and gain some understanding of its
successes and failures. In the process, we may discover that other
projects are also underway, some of them quite powerful and capable of
weakening or subverting the cause of rights entirely.
97. Yngvesson, supra note 6.

